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PREVENTING UNCONSTITUTIONAL GERRYMANDERING:
ESCAPING THE INTENT/EFFECTS QUAGMIRE
Robert Farley ∗
Gerrymandering describes “[t]he practice of dividing a geographical area into electoral districts . . . to give one political party an
1
unfair advantage by diluting the opposition’s voting strength.” In
other words, gerrymandering involves aligning electoral districts so
that the favored political party will receive the majority of votes in a
majority of districts. The Supreme Court of the United States has accepted that gerrymandering is unconstitutional in certain circum2
stances. The Court has stated that unconstitutional gerrymandering
occurs “when the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will
consistently degrade a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on the
3
political process as a whole.” As the Supreme Court has recognized,
the right to vote is a fundamental right guaranteed under the United
4
States Constitution. Gerrymandering is therefore undesirable and
unconstitutional because, according to the Court, “a particular [political] group [may be] . . . denied its chance to effectively influence
5
the political process.”
Since the Supreme Court first began deciding claims of partisan
gerrymandering, the Court has consistently struggled to determine
whether a particular redistricting plan violates the Constitution, spe6
cifically the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
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ment. Today, the Court remains fractured as to whether any man8
ageable standard exists.
Gerrymandering rose to the forefront of election law shortly
after the Supreme Court announced that the Equal Protection Clause
requires equal population size in the electoral districts within each
9
state. This rule, known as the “one-person, one-vote” principle, ostensibly solved the problem of vote dilution caused by population
shifts (otherwise known as malapportionment) by requiring equality
in voting-age population between state and congressional electoral
10
districts. However, by holding states to that objectively measurable
standard, the “one-person, one-vote” principle allowed state legislatures to dilute the voting power of certain political groups by organizing districts to assure that, while each is equal in population size, a
majority of citizens in a majority of electoral districts represent the
11
incumbent political party. Such reapportionment, although complying with “one-person, one-vote”, dilutes the voting strength of the
12
disfavored party.
The failure by the Supreme Court to discern a manageable gerrymandering standard reflects the difficulty in distinguishing between
regular, non-partisan redistricting and unconstitutional gerrymandering. This is primarily because, whether or not a given redistricting
plan is motivated by partisan concerns, one political party will always
13
defeat the other.
Thus, gerrymandering cannot be objectively
measured, unlike malapportionment, by the effects of the redistrict-

7

See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006);
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
8
See Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006); see also infra Part III.
9
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–64 (1964) (holding that voting is a fundamental right under the Constitution and the “one-person, one-vote” principle applies
to state legislative electoral districts under the Equal Protection Clause); Wesberry v.
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964) (holding that the “one-person, one-vote” principle
applies to districts electing members of the House of Representatives under Art. I, §
2, of the Constitution, which requires that House members be elected “by the People
of the several States”).
10
See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568 (holding that “the Equal Protection Clause requires . . . [apportionment] on a population basis”).
11
See Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 546 (2004).
12
Id.
13
See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986) (“A group’s electoral power is
not unconstitutionally diminished by the simple fact of an apportionment scheme
that makes winning elections more difficult, and a failure of proportional representation alone does not constitute impermissible discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.”).
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ing plan on elections. Because of this, the Court continues to struggle with determining when a redistricting plan becomes unconstitutional despite complying with the “one-person, one-vote” standard.
This Comment proposes that, instead of analyzing the effects of
redistricting, the Court can much more easily prevent gerrymandering by protecting the process of redistricting and ensuring that there
is little to no opportunity or incentive to gerrymander for the sake of
protecting legislative incumbents. Specifically, the Court should
adopt an irrebuttable presumption of validity for any redistricting
done by an independent, nonpartisan redistricting committee. In
14
addition, the Court should hold that mid-decade redistricting is presumptively unconstitutional, allowable only where the State can prove
a legitimate interest, such as a more accurate reflection in population
changes, rather than a change in the political party controlling the
redistricting. In conjunction, these two changes work to eliminate
partisan redistricting by creating an incentive to adopt a nonpartisan
redistricting committee and a disincentive to utilize mid-decade redistricting, unless related to a legitimate interest, not partisan motivations. In this way, the Court can ensure that partisan motivations do
not influence the redistricting process. In addition, the Court avoids
analyzing the effects of redistricting, which has thus far produced no
manageable standards.
Part I of this Comment will discuss the history of malapportionment and analyze the Court’s “one-person, one-vote” standard. Part
II of this Comment will review and discuss the Court’s gerrymandering jurisprudence. Part III of this Comment will analyze the Court’s
current gerrymandering jurisprudence as compared with its malapportionment decisions and discuss why, so far, the Court has failed to
address adequately the problem of gerrymandering in light of its
malapportionment jurisprudence. Part IV of this Comment will offer
a new solution that avoids the problems associated with the Court’s
current gerrymandering jurisprudence by focusing on the process,
not the effects, of gerrymandering, and will discuss the potential viability and legal ramifications of the proposed solution. Finally, Part
14

The U.S. Census Bureau is required to provide decennial population counts of
voting districts for the purposes of redistricting. 13 U.S.C. § 141 (2000). After such
information is furnished, the public body responsible for redistricting within each
state must use this information to correct any population deviations between districts. Id. Mid-decade redistricting, on the other hand, involves the replacement of a
districting plan enacted pursuant to a census report “in the middle of a decade, for
the sole purpose of maximizing partisan advantage.” League of United Latin Am.
Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2631 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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V of this Comment will conclude with a summary of the argument
and proposed solution.
I.

THE HISTORY OF MALAPPORTIONMENT
15

“Courts ought not to enter this political thicket.”
The Supreme Court of the United States’ malapportionment jurisprudence has played a critical role in the subsequent cases dealing
with partisan gerrymandering. The Court’s prior analyses in the various cases dealing with malapportionment have clearly influenced the
16
Court’s current gerrymandering jurisprudence. The Court’s focus
on the effects of malapportionment with respect to electoral districts
led to the “one-person, one-vote” standard that objectively measures
17
whether a constitutional violation has occurred. In turn, this has
led the Court to focus similarly on the objective effects of partisan
18
gerrymandering. Because of its case-by-case focus on the effects of
gerrymandering, the Court has failed to articulate an objective standard to determine whether an Equal Protection violation has oc19
curred. In order to understand the problems facing the Court in
the gerrymandering context, it is important to understand the history
of malapportionment in the Court, the response of the Court to
malapportioned election districts, and the constitutional standards
that the Court has adopted. The first section of this part will discuss
the Court’s initial reluctance to decide such cases, and the second
section will trace the Court’s more recent approach to malapportionment under the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. The Court’s Move Toward Justiciability
20

Article IV, Section 4, of the United States Constitution states
that “[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union
21
a Republican Form of Government.” In interpreting this provision,
the Supreme Court has historically refused to adjudicate claims alleg22
ing a violation of the Guarantee Clause and has stated that this

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
See infra Part II.
See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379–80 (1963).
See infra Parts II, III.
See infra Part II.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
Id.
Id.
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clause presents a nonjusticiable political issue.
In Colegrove v.
24
Green, Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, held that a challenge to a legislative redistricting was a nonjusticiable political ques25
tion.
The plaintiffs in Colegrove attempted to invalidate congressional districts in Illinois because of the population inequalities
26
between districts. Justice Frankfurter stated that “[t]o sustain this
27
action would cut very deep into the very being of Congress.” Thus,
the Supreme Court was initially adamant in its refusal to adjudicate
claims dealing with apportionment and districting, despite the presence of objectively measurable shifts in population and subsequent
28
vote dilution. However, the Court soon found a vehicle for change
29
in the Reconstruction Era Amendments.
30
In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, the Supreme Court reversed the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s dismissal of the
31
plaintiffs’ complaint. The plaintiffs alleged that an act passed by the
Alabama Legislature deprived them of the right to vote by reapportioning their district to “remove from the city all save only four or five
of its 400 Negro voters while not removing a single white voter or resi32
dent.” Justice Frankfurter, again writing for the Court, held that, if
disenfranchisement was proved, the plaintiffs would have a justiciable
33
cause of action under the Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibits
the states from depriving any citizen of his or her right to vote on the
34
basis of race. The Court in Gomillion based its reasoning on the observation that, prior to the legislative redistricting, the district in
question was shaped like a regular square, but, as a result of the al23

See, e.g., Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912); Luther v.
Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
24
328 U.S. 549 (1946).
25
Id. at 556.
26
Id. at 550–51.
27
Id. at 556.
28
Id. at 566–67 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black noted that the population
range between the congressional election districts in question ranged from 612,000
to 914,000, and additional districts in Illinois ranged from 112,116 to 385,207. Id. at
566. In addition, Justice Black noted that congressional electoral districts in Illinois
were last apportioned in 1901, and every Census through 1940 “showed a growth of
population in Illinois and a substantial shift in the distribution of population among
the districts established in 1901.” Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 567.
29
U.S. CONST. amends. XIII–XV.
30
364 U.S. 339 (1960).
31
Id. at 348.
32
Id. at 341.
33
U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
34
See Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 341–42.
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leged legislative disenfranchisement, it was transformed into an irregular twenty-eight-sided figure, which had the effect of “depriv[ing]
the Negro petitioners discriminatorily of the benefits of residence . . .
35
including . . . the right to vote in municipal elections.” Thus, focusing on the measurable effects of the redistricting plan in question,
the Court approved federal court involvement in the narrow circumstances of racial malapportionment under the Fifteenth Amend36
ment.
37
Soon afterwards in Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court held for
the first time that malapportionment cases were justiciable under the
38
Equal Protection Clause.
The district court, relying on Colegrove,
dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint alleging unconstitutional vote di39
lution as a result of district malapportionment. In an opinion by
Justice Brennan, the Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and held
that such claims were justiciable, not as Guarantee Clause claims, but
as claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
40
Amendment. Baker thus overturned Colegrove and opened the door
for federal court involvement in malapportionment and redistrict41
ing.
B. An Objective Measurement of a Constitutional Violation: The
“One-Person, One-Vote” Standard
Baker v. Carr, however, did not address an important issue: the
proper standard under the Equal Protection Clause to determine
whether districts are properly apportioned. This question was an42
swered in a series of cases, beginning with Gray v. Sanders. At issue
in Sanders was the Georgia state system of electing representatives by

35

Id.
Id. at 345.
37
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
38
Id. at 237.
39
Id. at 209.
40
Id. at 237.
41
Interestingly, Justice Brennan’s majority opinion omitted any reference to Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in Colegrove, decided sixteen years earlier. Justice Brennan
cited the Court’s Guarantee Clause jurisprudence and stated that, while Guarantee
Clause claims were nonjusticiable, the Equal Protection Clause presented no barrier.
Id. at 223–24. Justice Brennan failed to mention that Colegrove spoke directly to the
equal protection issue and had held that malapportionment claims were nonjusticiable under the Equal Protection Clause. See Pamela S. Karlan, Politics by Other Means,
85 VA. L. REV. 1697, 1717–18 (1999).
42
372 U.S. 368 (1963).
36
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county. In particular, similar to the federal Electoral College, candidates for election had to receive a majority of “county votes,” where
each county was given a certain number of votes based on population
44
size. The Court held that the inequality in population size between
counties was unconstitutional because it diluted the voting strength
45
Writing for the
of individuals living in more populous counties.
Court, Justice Douglas asked: “How then can one person be given
twice or 10 times the voting power of another person in a statewide
election merely because he lives in a rural area or because he lives in
46
the smallest rural county?” The disparity of voting power between
counties influenced the Court’s decision, as Justice Douglas noted
that a single county vote for a candidate in one county represented
938 citizens, while in another county a single vote represented 92,721
47
citizens. The Court then articulated the standard that governs such
claims: Once the electoral district in question is identified, every elec48
tion participant located inside the district must have an equal vote.
In other words, electoral districts must be drawn in such a way that
each district is equal in population size.
49
The next year, in Wesberry v. Sanders, the Court applied the
“one-person, one-vote” principle to invalidate a state statute providing
50
electoral districts for the House of Representatives. Justice Black,
writing for the Court, noted that one electoral district contained
51
823,680 citizens, while another contained only 272,154 citizens. Because there was one congressman for each district, the Court reasoned that the votes of the citizens living in the more populous dis52
tricts were worth less than those living in the less populous districts.
53
The Court held that Article I, Section 2, of the Constitution, which
provides that “Representatives shall be chosen ‘by the People of the
several States’ and shall be ‘apportioned among the several States . . .
54
according to their respective Numbers,’” means “one-person, one43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

Id. at 370–71.
Id.
Id. at 379.
Id.
Id. at 371.
Sanders, 372 U.S. at 379.
376 U.S. 1 (1964).
Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 8.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 17.
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vote.” “To say that a vote is worth more in one district than in another would not only run counter to our fundamental ideas of democratic government, it would cast aside the principle of a House of
56
Representatives elected ‘by the People’ . . . .” Thus, the Court invalidated the electoral scheme because it failed to comply with the
“one-person, one-vote” principle in electing members of the House of
57
Representatives.
58
Finally, in Reynolds v. Sims, the Court refined its “one-person,
59
one-vote” standard in the context of state legislative districts. At issue in Reynolds was the apportionment of state legislative electoral districts, where Alabama’s thirty-five Senate districts varied in population
60
size from 15,417 citizens to more than 600,000 citizens. In addition,
Alabama’s House of Representatives consisted of 100 elected officials
61
from districts varying in size from 13,462 citizens to 634,864 citizens.
Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, broadly held that population size was the only permissible criterion for drawing electoral dis62
tricts. “Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators
63
are elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests.”
Furthermore, Chief Justice Warren noted that “[t]he resulting discrimination against those individual voters living in disfavored areas is
easily demonstrable mathematically. Their right to vote is simply not
the same right to vote as that of those living in a favored part of the
64
state.” Thus, the Court solidified the “one-person, one-vote” principle as the objective measure of equal protection for voting rights be65
tween state electoral districts.
Since Reynolds, the Court has consistently reaffirmed the “one66
person, one-vote” principle in a variety of settings. Seldom has the
55

Id. at 18.
Id. at 8.
57
Id. at 18.
58
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
59
Id. at 568.
60
Id. at 545–46.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 562.
63
Id.
64
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 563.
65
Id. at 568 (“Simply stated, an individual’s right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when
compared with votes of citizens living in other parts of the State.”).
66
See generally Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970) (applying the principle to elected junior college governing body); Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S.
474 (1968) (applying the principle to elected county commissioners).
56
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Court wavered from requiring population equality between electoral
67
districts. The principle itself addressed a fundamental problem facing the courts: population shifts created an extreme imbalance that
led to malapportionment of electoral districts, but incumbents were
unlikely to change the districts and essentially vote for their own re68
69
moval. After Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court mandated that electoral districts be drawn to reflect population equality so that each individual’s vote is weighted the same as every other individual within
70
the state. The Court objectively assessed whether the Equal Protection Clause had been violated simply by comparing the effects of a
given redistricting plan: the population sizes between state electoral
71
districts. Even prior to Baker, the Court used an objective “effects”
72
analysis to invalidate a redistricting plan in Gomillion. Districts became equal according to population, but they also became necessarily
more unnatural in appearance. Soon, legislatures began to exploit
this to their advantage.
II. THE HISTORY OF GERRYMANDERING
“[T]he majority has wholly failed to reckon with
73
what the future may hold in store . . . .”
The Supreme Court has stated that partisan gerrymandering
may violate the Equal Protection Clause where a particular group is
67

Generally speaking, precise mathematical equality is not required, although
there must be “a good-faith effort to achieve” such equality. Kirkpatrick v. Preisler,
394 U.S. 526, 530–31 (1969). In Kirkpatrick, the Court invalidated a redistricting plan
whereby the greatest deviations from mathematical equality were 3.13% above and
2.83% below. Id. at 528–29. In Karcher v. Daggett, the Court invalidated a redistricting plan whereby the greatest deviation between districts was 0.7%. 462 U.S. 725,
732 (1983). However, the Court has allowed deviations under limited circumstances.
See, e.g., Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981) (allowing system for electing water reclamation district directors to apportion voting power among certain landowners according to the amount of land owned).
68
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 852–53
(2d ed. 2002).
69
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
70
See supra Part I.B.
71
See id. This solution was a fundamental shift in the nature of apportionment,
as districts had previously been drawn using natural boundaries: “In order to bring
legislative districts as close to [one-person, one-vote] as possible, states must disregard preexisting political boundaries such as cities, townships, and counties. Adherence to these traditional boundaries was, historically, the principal constraint on
creative districting . . . .” Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 103 (2000).
72
See supra notes 30–36 and accompanying text.
73
Baker, 369 U.S. at 339 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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“denied its chance to effectively influence the political process.”
The Court’s justification for involvement in this area thus rests on
similar principles as the Court’s justification for adjudicating claims
of malapportionment: the Equal Protection Clause requires that an
individual’s right to vote be given meaning in the sense that the fundamental right to vote cannot be abridged through the districting
process if the result is that participation in elections nears a mere
75
formality. As discussed above, malapportionment denies voters in
more populous districts a chance to influence the political process as
76
effectively as those in other districts. The Court remedied this con77
Unlike
cern by requiring population equality between districts.
malapportionment, the effects of partisan gerrymandering are not
easily measurable for purposes of determining whether an equal protection violation exists. The measurable effects of partisan gerrymandering are the opportunistic inclusion and exclusion in various
electoral districts of certain voters based on their political affiliation.
However, the very nature of elections assumes that one political party
will prevail over the other in any individual election because the
amount of voters associated with each party will vary among various
districts. “Difficult as the issues engendered by Baker v. Carr may have
been, nothing comparable to the mathematical yardstick used in apportionment cases is available to identify the difference between
permissible and impermissible adverse impacts on the voting strength
78
of political groups.” Thus, the Court cannot measure the effects of
partisan gerrymandering simply by examining the amounts of Republican and Democrat voters as it could with the population differences
between each district. The following section will, in light of this difficulty, discuss the Court’s approach to measuring the effects of partisan gerrymandering on election districts in order to determine when
the Equal Protection Clause has been violated.

74

Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132–33 (1986). “[A]n equal protection violation may be found only where the electoral system substantially disadvantages certain
voters in their opportunity to influence the political process effectively.” Id. at 133.
75
See id. at 119 (stating “districting that would ‘operate to minimize or cancel out
the voting strength of . . . political elements of the voting population’ . . . raise[s] a
constitutional question”) (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965) (emphasis omitted)).
76
See supra Part I.
77
Id.
78
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 90 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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A. Searching for a Measurable Standard of Gerrymandering
Initially, the Court stressed its reluctance to invalidate districts
79
drawn on the basis of political affiliation: in Gaffney v. Cummings, ten
80
years after Gray v. Sanders, the Court reversed a lower court’s invalidation of districts drawn to reflect Connecticut’s statewide political
81
strength. That is, each district was drawn to reflect the proportion
82
of Democrat and Republican voters across the state. The Court expressly recognized the right of the legislature to take political factors
into consideration when reapportioning districts according to the
83
“one-person, one-vote” principle. Although the Court attempted to
draw a distinction between legitimately recognizing the respective political strengths of a state’s party system and eliminating one party’s
84
political strengths, the Court ultimately took a passive approach to
political redistricting:
District lines are rarely neutral phenomena. They can well determine what district will be predominantly Democratic or predominantly Republican, or make a close race likely. Redistricting
may pit incumbents against one another or make very difficult the
election of the most experienced legislator. The reality is that districting inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political
consequences.
....
. . . [J]udicial interest should be at its lowest ebb when a State
purports fairly to allocate political power to the parties in accordance with their voting strength and, within quite tolerable limits,
succeeds in doing so. . . . [The courts do not] have a constitutional warrant to invalidate a state plan, otherwise within tolerable
population limits, because it undertakes, not to minimize or
eliminate the political strength of any group or party, but to recognize it and, through districting, provide a rough sort of propor85
tional representation in the legislative halls of the State.

The Court again took up the gerrymandering issue thirteen
86
years later in Davis v. Bandemer. In Davis, the Court considered an
79

412 U.S. 735 (1973).
372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment embodies the “one-person, one-vote” standard with respect
to state legislative electoral districts).
81
Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 754.
82
Id. at 753.
83
See id. at 754.
84
See id.
85
Id. at 753–54.
86
478 U.S. 109 (1986).
80
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issue distinct from Gaffney, namely, the redistricting of the legislature
on political grounds by the incumbents for the purpose of retaining
87
control. The Republican majority of the Indiana state legislature
reapportioned the electoral districts in order to keep a republican
88
majority in office. The Democrats sued, and the district court held
89
the plan unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. On
appeal, a majority of the Supreme Court found such gerrymandering
claims justiciable:
The issue here is of course different from that adjudicated in
Reynolds. It does not concern districts of unequal size. Not only
does everyone have the right to vote and have his vote counted,
but each elector may vote for and be represented by the same
number of lawmakers. Rather, the claim is that each political
group in a State should have the same chance to elect representatives of its choice as any other political group. Nevertheless, the
issue is one of representation, and we decline to hold that such
90
claims are never justiciable.

Despite this finding of justiciability, the Court ultimately dismissed the action without a majority opinion on any other issue. Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun,
opined for reversal on the grounds that the district court’s test was
91
insufficient. The district court had held that the plaintiffs “need
only show that their proportionate voting influence has been ad92
versely affected.” The plurality stated that such a test was not re93
Instead, the plurality would have required by the Constitution.
quired the plaintiffs “to prove both intentional discrimination against
an identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on
94
that group.” However, mere disproportionate influence was an in95
sufficient standard to determine discrimination.
Instead, there
must be a “substantially greater showing of adverse effects than a
mere lack of proportional representation to support a finding of un96
constitutional vote dilution.”
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

Id. at 114.
Id. at 115.
Id.
Id. at 124.
Id. at 143 (plurality opinion).
Davis, 478 U.S. at 130.
Id.
Id. at 127.
Id. at 130.
Id. at 131.
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Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist, affirmed the dismissal on the grounds that partisan gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable and such issues should be left
“to the legislative branch as the Framers of the Constitution unques97
tionably intended.”
Justice O’Connor would have held all such
claims as nonjusticiable political questions because to hold otherwise
would eventually lead to a requirement of “simple proportionality as
the standard for measuring the normal representational entitlements
98
of a political party.” Justice O’Connor recognized:
[T]he individual’s right to vote does not imply that political
groups have a right to be free from discriminatory impairment of
their group voting strength. Treating the vote dilution claims of
political groups as cognizable would effectively collapse the “fundamental distinction between state action that inhibits an individual’s right to vote and state action that affects the political
strength of various groups that compete for leadership in a de99
mocratically governed community.”

Justices Powell and Stevens agreed with Justice White’s plurality
as to the appropriate standard with which to adjudicate such claims,
but disagreed with the finding that there was no equal protection vio100
Justice Powell articulated the view that “the merits of a gerlation.
rymandering claim must be determined by reference to the configurations of the districts, the observance of political subdivision lines,
and other criteria that have independent relevance to the fairness of
101
redistricting.” In Justice Powell’s opinion, the most important consideration with respect to gerrymandering claims is the “shape[] of
voting districts and adherence to established political subdivision
102
boundaries.”
103
In Vieth v. Jubelirer, the Supreme Court was again faced with a
partisan gerrymandering claim, this time from Pennsylvania where
the Republican majority adopted a redistricting plan protecting its
104
Democratic voters sued, claiming that the reapportionmajority.

97

Id. at 144 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Davis, 478 U.S. at 157.
99
Id. at 150–51 (quoting City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 83 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
100
Id. at 161–62 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
101
Id. at 165.
102
Id. at 173.
103
541 U.S. 267 (2004).
104
Id. at 272.
98
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105

ment plan violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court in Vieth
remained fractured with respect to the justiciability question as well
106
as the applicable standard with which to adjudicate such claims.
Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, concluded that Davis should
be overturned, as the Court had wholly failed to discover any “judicially discernable and manageable standards by which political ger107
rymander cases are to be decided,” as required under the six-part
108
Justice Scalia noted that, since Davis, “[t]he lower
test of Baker.
courts have lived with [the] assurance [that a] standard [exists] (or
more precisely, lack of assurance that there is no standard), coupled
109
with that inability to specify a standard, for the past 18 years.”
Eighteen years of judicial effort with virtually nothing to show
for it justify us in revisiting the question whether the standard
promised by Bandemer exists. . . . [N]o judicially discernable and
manageable standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering
claims have emerged. Lacking them, we must conclude that political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable and that Bandemer
110
was wrongly decided.

Justice Scalia reviewed a number of lower court decisions and
concluded that the plurality’s two-part test in Bandemer requiring
proof of both discriminatory intent and discriminatory effect on an
identifiable political group had been wholly unworkable against

105

Id.
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 267–368.
107
Id. at 278 (plurality opinion) (quoting Davis, 478 U.S. at 123).
108
See id. at 277–78. Baker v. Carr set out six independent tests for determining
whether a political question exists:
“[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of the government; or [5] an unusual need
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
[6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.”
Id. at 277–78 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). Although Justice
Scalia’s plurality opinion focused on the second test, he noted in his opinion that the
Framers of the Constitution had explicitly provided a remedy for claims such as gerrymandering in Article I, Section 4, of the Constitution. Id. at 275. This provision,
“while leaving in state legislatures the initial power to draw districts for federal elections, permitted Congress to ‘make or alter’ those districts if it wished.” Id.
109
Id. at 279.
110
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281 (plurality opinion).
106
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111

claims of gerrymandering.
Addressing the appellants’ proposed
standards, Justice Scalia highlighted the analytical differences between the “one-person, one-vote” rule and the issue of political gerrymandering:
Our one-person, one-vote cases . . . have no bearing upon this
question, neither in principle nor in practicality. Not in principle, because to say that each individual must have an equal say in
the selection of representatives, and hence that a majority of individuals must have a majority say, is not at all to say that each discernible group, whether farmers or urban dwellers or political
parties, must have representation equivalent to its numbers. And
not in practicality, because the easily administrable standard of
population equality adopted by Wesberry and Reynolds enables
judges to decide whether a violation has occurred (and to remedy
it) essentially on the basis of three readily determined factors—
where the plaintiff lives, how many voters are in his district, and
how many voters in other districts; whereas requiring judges to
decide whether a districting system will produce a statewide majority for a majority party casts them forth upon a sea of imponderables, and asks them to make determinations that not even
112
election experts can agree upon.

Thus, Justice Scalia and the plurality recognized not only that malapportionment and gerrymandering are distinct constitutional harms,
but also that the standard of measuring malapportionment is inapplicable to determining whether an unconstitutional gerrymander exists.
Justice Stevens, writing in dissent, would have held that gerrymandering claims are justiciable and believed that the standards governing racial gerrymandering should similarly apply to claims against
113
partisan gerrymandering.
Justice Stevens’s standard would focus

111

See id. Justice Scalia also rejected the appellant’s similar proposed standard of
proving discriminatory intent and effect by showing that “the mapmakers acted with
a predominant intent to achieve partisan advantage . . . shown by direct evidence or by
circumstantial evidence that other neutral and legitimate redistricting criteria were
subordinated to the goal of achieving partisan advantage.” Id. at 284.
112
Id. at 290 (internal citations omitted).
113
See id. at 329 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649
(1993), the Supreme Court held that
a plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute under the Equal Protection Clause may state a claim by alleging that the legislation, though
race neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything
other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race . . . .
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on the effects of redistricting as well as the “predominant intent” behind the legislative districting plan:
The racial gerrymandering cases therefore supply a judicially
manageable standard for determining when partisanship, like
race, has played too great of a role in the districting process. . . . If
. . . the predominant motive of the legislators who designed [a
district], and the sole justification for its bizarre shape, was a purpose to discriminate against a political minority, that invidious
114
purpose should invalidate the district.

Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsberg in dissent, would also
have held that such claims are justiciable and would invalidate politically drawn districts if the plaintiffs met the burden of proving a five115
Justice Souter’s test requires the plaintiff to show (1)
element test.
that he or she belonged to a “cohesive political group . . . which
would normally be a major party”; (2) that the legislature ignored
other, permissible factors in drawing the district in question; (3) a
“correlation[] between the district’s deviations from traditional districting principles and the distribution of the population of his
group”; (4) a hypothetical district less egregious than the district in
question that includes the plaintiff’s residence and “deviate[s] less
from traditional districting principles than the actual district”; and
(5) “that the defendants acted intentionally to manipulate the shape
116
Once the plaintiff has proved these elements, Jusof the district.”
tice Souter would shift the burden to the defendants to rebut the evidence by showing some permissible justification for the districting
117
plan in question.
The Supreme Court most recently addressed the limits on ger118
rymandering in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry. Following the 2000 census, Texas implemented a redistricting plan for
119
its congressional electoral districts.
Then in 2003, the newly
elected Republican majority implemented a mid-decade redistricting

Vieth, 541 U.S. at 329 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913
(1995), the Supreme Court clarified its holding in Shaw and held that a district’s irrational or bizarre shape was “persuasive circumstantial evidence that race for its own
sake, and not other districting principles, was the legislature’s dominant and controlling rationale in drawing its district lines.” Id.
114
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 336 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115
See id. at 347 (Souter, J., dissenting).
116
Id. at 347–50.
117
Id. at 351.
118
126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).
119
Id. at 2605–06 (plurality opinion).
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120

plan.
The plaintiffs argued, among other things, that the middecade redistricting plan was an unconstitutional partisan gerryman121
der under the Equal Protection Clause.
In Perry, a majority of the Court affirmed that gerrymandering
claims are justiciable under Davis, notwithstanding the plurality opin122
ion in Vieth.
The Court issued no other majority opinion with re123
spect to political gerrymandering. Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion rejected the notion that mid-decade redistricting is
unconstitutional, even when it is done for purely partisan motivations
124
Joined by Jusimmediately after a new political majority is elected.
tices Souter and Ginsberg, Justice Kennedy concluded:
[W]e disagree with appellants’ view that a legislature’s decision to
override a valid, court-drawn plan mid-decade is sufficiently suspect to give shape to a reliable standard for identifying unconstitutional political gerrymanders. We conclude that appellants
have established no legally impermissible use of political classifications. For this reason, they state no claim on which relief may
125
be granted . . . .

In dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, would have
held that mid-decade redistricting for solely partisan purposes states a
126
justiciable claim.
In opposition to Justice Kennedy, Justice Stevens
stated his belief that “courts can easily identify the motive for redis127
tricting when the legislature is under no legal obligation to act.”
128
Justice Stevens would require an individual with standing “to prove
129
both improper purpose and effect.” Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Thomas, would have held gerrymandering claims nonjusticiable con130
sistent with Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Vieth.
120

Id. For an explanation of mid-decade redistricting, see supra note 14.
See id., at 2607 (plurality opinion).
122
Id.
123
The Court did, however, conclude by a five-to-four margin that one of the districts was violative of section two of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §
1973(b), which prohibits, among other things, racial gerrymandering. Id. at 2612–
24.
124
Perry, 126 S. Ct. at 2609 (plurality opinion).
125
Id. at 2612.
126
See id. at 2626 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127
Id. at 2632.
128
For purposes of standing, Justice Stevens would require a plaintiff “to prove
that he is either a candidate or a voter who resided in a district that was changed by a
new districting plan.” Id. at 2642 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
129
Perry, 126 S. Ct. at 2642.
130
Id. at 2663 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
121
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Thus, although the Court repudiated the plurality’s opinion in
Vieth, it broke no new ground with respect to manageable standards
for gerrymandering claims. In addition, the Court’s fracture concerning mid-decade redistricting is indicative of the Court’s larger
problem of discerning factors to determine when a reapportionment
plan crosses the line into an unconstitutional gerrymander.
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Incompatibility of the Intent/Effects Test with Respect to
Partisan Gerrymandering Claims
The Supreme Court’s difficulty in finding manageable standards
with which to judge claims of gerrymandering stems from the relationship between gerrymandering and malapportionment and the
fact that the Court is constrained by the “one-person, one-vote” requirement. Although gerrymandering has been around for centuries, it was considered until recently to be beyond the scope of federal
131
After the Supreme Court held that the Equal
court jurisdiction.
Protection Clause requires electoral districts comply with the “oneperson, one-vote” requirement, the courts began judicial oversight of
regularly occurring legislative redistricting in order to assure compli132
ance with this standard.
This invariably meant drawing districts
somewhat artificially, without regard to natural boundaries that had,
133
The Court’s willto a certain extent, previously defined districts.
ingness to tolerate artificial districts and regularly occurring redistricting by legislatures, in order to fulfill the “one-person, one-vote”
requirement, allowed the legislatures to define their districts along
partisan lines by elevating population equality above all other consid134
erations.
The Court recognized as much when it stated the possibility that
an “apportionment scheme, under the circumstances of a particular
case, [could] operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength
131

See Whitney M. Eaton, Where Do We Draw the Line? Partisan Gerrymandering and
the State of Texas, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 1193, 1193–94 (2006).
132
See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
133
See McConnell, supra note 71, at 103.
134
Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 11, at 546 (“Precisely because it elevates equality of population over all other criteria, one person, one vote can serve as a smokescreen for politically driven deviations from other districting principles. When it
comes to district-level entrenchment, the necessity of tinkering with the lines every
ten years can turn into an opportunity to redraw districts to shore up incumbents
who otherwise might face defeat.”).
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of racial or political elements of the voting population.”
Thus,
Chief Justice Warren’s holding in Reynolds that population size is the
only permissible criterion for drawing election districts paved the way
for incumbents to protect their seats, themselves protected by the
136
shield of “one-person, one-vote.”
The Supreme Court’s requirement of “one-person, one-vote” in
137
Reynolds was a graceful solution to a particularly egregious problem.
The requirement is an objectively measurable standard by which to
judge whether a constitutional violation has occurred. Specifically, a
districting plan is unconstitutional if it deviates from that require138
Ironically, while judicial inment to an impermissible extent.
volvement was arguably necessary for malapportionment, as incumbents would naturally be reluctant to vote themselves out of office,
incumbents now protect themselves through the same legislative redistricting that Reynolds requires, albeit with ulterior motives: “If new
135

Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965); see also Kristina Betts, Redistricting:
Who Should Draw the Lines? The Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission as a Model
for Change, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 171, 177 (2006), noting that:
Under the theory of separation of powers, redistricting falls within
the power of the legislature, which creates yet another political issue.
Although many state statutes bar legislators from drawing maps to protect incumbents, the U.S. Constitution does not prohibit this practice.
The problem with allowing legislators or legislative committees to draw
their own maps to protect incumbents is that legislators have an inherent vested interest in the redistricting process because they want to retain their seats. Under certain circumstances, it is inevitable that the
majority party will strive to protect its advantage.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
136
See McConnell, supra note 71, at 103 (stating that once the Court decided Reynolds, “legislative line-drawers were able to draw maps to produce the results they desired, rendering elections less a reflection of popular opinion than of legislative
craftsmanship”); see also City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 90 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (noting that “nothing comparable to the mathematical yardstick used in
apportionment cases is available to identify the difference between permissible and
impermissible adverse impacts on the voting strength of political groups”).
137
See Michael Weaver, Uncertainty Maintained: The Split Decision over Partisan Gerrymanders in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1273, 1292 (2005) (noting that
“[t]he one person, one vote principle dramatically corrected the [population] deviations in congressional districts, and nullified a majority of states’ electoral district
maps”); see also Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 11, at 544, stating:
The central vice presented by [the malapportionment cases] was
minority entrenchment. Many states had last redrawn state legislative
boundaries at the turn of the twentieth century, and their legislatures
had become backwater relics of past political deals, controlled by lawmakers from rural hamlets in decline whose reactionary politics stymied the interests of voters in the burgeoning cities and suburbs.
Id.
138
See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text.
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districts must be drawn,” the majority party thinks, “what is there to stop us
from drawing them so as to create a majority of our political party in a major139
The
ity of those districts, all the while keeping with one-person, one-vote?”
Supreme Court’s attempt to discern between such invidious motivation and legitimate majority victories is the crux of the problem with
140
The only
the Court’s current gerrymandering jurisprudence.
agreement between all nine Justices in Vieth was that eventually ex141
treme partisan redistricting is unconstitutional.
The disagreement
concerns the standards for measuring when redistricting crosses the
142
line from constitutional to unconstitutional.
As evident from the discussion in Parts II and III, those Justices
that would hold gerrymandering claims justiciable take their cue
from the malapportionment cases and inquire as to the effects of re143
However, the effects of gerrymandering cannot be obdistricting.
jectively measured and distinguished from politically neutral redis144
tricting.
In the malapportionment cases, the measure of the effect
of redistricting was also the measure of the equal protection violation:
145
interdistrict population inequality.
In contrast, gerrymandering
139

See, e.g., Adam Raviv, Unsafe Harbors: One Person, One Vote and Partisan Redistricting, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001, 1046 (2005) (arguing that “[t]he easiest feasible standard to use for partisan one person, one vote deviations is the standard set for partisan gerrymandering . . . . Constitutionally speaking, gerrymandering is the closest
cousin to one person, one vote violations, as they both involve the manipulation of
voting districts toward a political end, and come under equal protection scrutiny as a
result.”).
140
See Erika Lewis, Trailblaze or Retreat? Political Gerrymandering After Vieth v. Jubelirer, 27 HAW. L. REV. 269, 293 (2004) (noting that “the search for judicially manageable and discernible standards for political gerrymandering is elusive”); see also Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 11, at 574, stating:
The normal distribution of populations across 435 congressional districts will yield a range of districts, from those that are highly competitive and will likely elect centrist candidates or swing from election to
election between the two major parties, to those that are more politically homogeneous and will gravitate toward the poles of the political
spectrum.
141
See Mitchell N. Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 TEX. L. REV. 781, 809–10
(2005).
142
See id.
143
See supra Parts II, III.
144
See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 290 (2004) (stating that under “a legislature that draws district lines with no objectives in mind except compactness and respect for the lines of political subdivisions . . . [,] political groups that tend to cluster
. . . would be systematically affected by what might be called a ‘natural’ packing effect”).
145
See supra Part I. In addition to population inequality, the malapportionment
cases also examined the shapes of various districts. Id. This measure is flawed in the
gerrymandering context for the simple fact that “one-person, one-vote” requires that
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has no corresponding objective measure, as inequality in the party
strength is simply a function of individual politics and is necessary for
the majority-rule principle contained in the Constitution’s guarantee
146
Thus, unlike malapportionof a republican form of government.
ment, an effects-based test is not sufficient for purposes of gerrymandering, because, regardless of whether a gerrymander has occurred,
one political party will always lose. In other words, the effects of a
partisan gerrymander may be similar in many respects to a validly
drawn redistricting plan that simply happens to contain a majority of
147
The Court therefore finds itself taking a “how
one political party.
far is too far” approach, which assumes that particularly egregious ef148
fects may be unconstitutional.
The legislature that takes into account partisan considerations
wants the party in power to remain in power. Simply measuring electoral losses is ineffective at getting to the root of the apparent equal
protection problem of gerrymandering: taking into account partisan
considerations. This is because it is difficult to determine objectively
whether a political party lost with or without the help of a “political
149
cartographer.”
Perhaps recognizing this dilemma, some of those members of
the Court that would hold such claims justiciable also attempt to discern the intent of the legislative body behind the redistricting plan in
150
question, in order to punish impermissible partisan effects.
“[A]
straightforward application of settled constitutional law leads to the
inescapable conclusion that the State may not decide to redistrict if
its sole motivation is ‘to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of
151
However,
racial or political elements of the voting population.’”
discerning a predominant intent of the redistricting body necessarily
involves inquiry into the effects of redistricting. For example, the
districts be drawn unnaturally, in order to contain an equal number of individuals.
Thus, the shape of a district may simply be the result of completely legitimate redistricting. Cf. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 165 (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing
that “the merits of a gerrymandering claim must be determined by reference to the
configurations of the districts”).
146
See McConnell, supra note 71, at 114–15.
147
See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 11, at 574.
148
See Berman, supra note 141, at 809–10 (noting that, in Vieth, “[f]or the first
time, all the Justices agreed that the pursuit of partisan advantage in redistricting is
sometimes unconstitutional”) (citations omitted).
149
See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 331 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
150
See, e.g., id. at 350 (Souter, J., dissenting).
151
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2634 (2006)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965)).
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plurality opinion in Davis advocated that the plaintiffs prove “both intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group and an
152
Such intentional disactual discriminatory effect on that group.”
crimination would be measured by criteria such as the shapes of vari153
ous districts. Similarly, Justice Stevens argued in his dissent in Vieth
that the “predominant intent” behind the legislative redistricting
154
plan was a manageable measure of partisan redistricting.
This
would require a court to find such intent “if no neutral criterion can
155
Likewise, Justice Souter
be identified to justify the lines drawn.”
would require that the plaintiffs prove, among other things, “that the
defendants acted intentionally to manipulate the shape of the dis156
But Justice Souter’s argument that “proving intent should
trict.”
not be hard” exposes the fact that the proof of intent requirement is
simply the inference drawn from the effects of the redistricting plan
157
Justice Souter notes that proof of intent would not be
in question.
difficult once the plaintiff has shown: (1) that a correlation exists between the redistricting plan’s deviations and a negative impact on the
plaintiffs’ political party and (2) that a redistricting plan with fewer
158
partisan deviations exists. Because the measure of effects is not appropriate in the gerrymandering context, this conceptualization of
159
Unlike malapportionment, the effects of
intent is likewise flawed.
partisan gerrymandering are not objectively measurable with any degree of ease or certainty. Additionally, inquiring as to the intent of
the legislature in hopes of discovering a partisan motivation is just as
difficult because there is not likely to be any direct evidence of a legislative body’s “state of mind.” This has led several members of the
Court to argue that such claims are not properly justiciable for want
of “judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
160
Indeed, the plurality opinion in Vieth felt compelled to overit.”

152

Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127 (1986).
See id. at 116.
154
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 341 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155
Id. at 339.
156
Id. at 350 (Souter, J., dissenting).
157
Id.
158
See id.
159
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
160
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); see also Lewis, supra note 140, at 288
(observing that the claim that “Bandemer’s intent-effect standard for partisan gerrymandering claims was a failure is a near-universal consensus”).
153
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turn Bandemer in light of “[e]ighteen years of essentially pointless liti161
gation.”
B. Overview of Alternative Proposals
In addition to the various standards proposed by the justices in
the foregoing opinions, there has been a multitude of proposed solutions by scholars attempting to correct the Court’s failure to ade162
Perhaps the most
quately adjudicate claims of gerrymandering.
radical of these is the argument that neither malapportionment nor
gerrymandering claims should be brought under the Equal Protec163
However, this is a minority position, as most scholars
tion Clause.
recognize the reality that Baker and Reynolds will likely never be over164
turned.
Indeed, the requirement of “one-person, one-vote” is
“[o]ne of the most firmly established principles of constitutional
165
Thus, although some proposals put forth arguments outside
law.”
of the Court’s current Equal Protection Clause framework, a realistic
solution to the problem of gerrymandering must take into account
the constraints posed by the requirement of “one-person, one-vote,”
namely, the ability of legislatures to create artificial districts for the
sake of equality.
161

Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (plurality opinion).
See, e.g., Ryan P. Bates, Congressional Authority to Require State Adoption of Independent Redistricting Commissions, 55 DUKE L.J. 333 (2005) (arguing that Congress has
the constitutional power to require individual states to adopt bipartisan redistricting
commissions, and that Congress should do so); JoAnn D. Kamuf, “Should I Stay or
Should I Go?”: The Current State of Partisan Gerrymandering Adjudication and a Proposal for
the Future, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 163, 209–10 (2005) (arguing that the Supreme Court
should adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims within a “freedom of association”
framework); McConnell, supra note 71 (arguing that malapportionment and gerrymandering claims should be brought under the Guarantee Clause); Amy M. Pugh,
Unresolved: Whether a Claim for Political Gerrymandering May Be Brought Under the First
Amendment?, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 373, 395–96 (2005) (concluding that political gerrymandering claims would be justiciable under the First Amendment: “[A]ny showing
of governmental discrimination based on political affiliation towards political participation in the electoral process, in association with a political party and in the expression of political views, will be subject to . . . strict scrutiny.”); Robert Redwine, Racial and Political Gerrymandering—Different Problems Require Different Solutions, 51 OKLA.
L. REV. 373, 401 (1998) (arguing that, in order to protect the minority political party,
approval of a redistricting plan should require a super-majority in the state legislature).
163
See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 71 (arguing that malapportionment and gerrymandering claims would be better served if brought under the Guarantee Clause).
164
See id. at 103 (noting that “[t]here are no dissenters from that proposition on
the Supreme Court, and there have been none for decades. Legislatures, litigants,
judges, and academics all accept the proposition”).
165
Id.
162
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These alternative proposals, however, will likely fail at the judicial level for the same reasons the Court’s own proposed standards
have failed: they presume that gerrymandering can be objectively
166
measured.
In addition, the sheer number of proposed solutions
may in fact belie the Court’s acceptance of any one of them. As the
plurality stated in Vieth, “the mere fact that these four dissenters come
up with three different standards—all of them different than the two
proposed in Bandemer and the one proposed here by appellants—
goes a long way to establishing that there is no constitutionally dis167
cernible standard.”
In addition to these proposals, Congress has recently sought to
regulate gerrymandering in congressional redistricting, with no suc168
cess. For example, in 2003 Rep. Maxine Waters (D-CA) proposed a
bill to preclude mid-decade redistricting by limiting states, in districting for the House of Representatives, to redistricting once every decennial census “unless the State is ordered by a Federal court to conduct such subsequent redistricting in order to comply with the
Constitution of the United States or to enforce the Voting Rights Act
of 1965 or otherwise enforce the voting rights of the people of that
169
In 1990, Congress proposed a bill that would regulate the
State.”
redistricting process for the House of Representatives by providing,
among other things, that “[d]istricts may not be established with the
intent or effect of diluting the voting strength of any person, or
170
group, including any political party.” The previous year, a similar bill
was proposed that provided “[t]he boundaries of each district may
not be drawn for the purpose of minimizing the voting strength of
any racial, ethnic, or economic group, or for the purpose of favoring any
171
political party.”
A number of states have undertaken attempts to correct gerrymandering by requiring that redistricting be accomplished, not by a
majority of the legislature, but by a neutral, bipartisan redistricting
172
body.
These states, through constitutional amendment, have
166

See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 292 (2004) (plurality opinion).
168
Id. at 276–77 (“Since 1980, no fewer than five bills have been introduced to
regulate gerrymandering in congressional districting.”).
169
H.R. 2090, 108th Cong. § 1 (2003) (citation omitted).
170
H.R. 5037, 101st Cong. § 1(b)(4) (1990) (emphasis added).
171
H.R. 1711, 101st Cong. § 2(c)(2)(A) (1989) (emphasis added).
172
See Redistricting Commissions: Legislative Plans, http://www.senate.leg.state
.mn.us/departments/scr/redist/red2000/apecomsn.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2007).
The following states currently employ some form of a bipartisan redistricting com167
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sought to take the partisan legislature out of the redistricting process
173
in order to ensure impartiality. Under this type of process, the legislature generally chooses an even number of Democrats and Republicans, and those individuals then choose a final member meeting the
174
States that require redistricting by a poapproval of both parties.
litically neutral body have the advantage of ensuring a fair and balanced method of redistricting without having to inquire into the effects or intent of the redistricting body, because a politically neutral
plan is, in effect, a bipartisan compromise that does not simply have
the best interests of one political party in mind at the expense of the
other party.
This type of plan also avoids the problems mentioned earlier
concerning the Court’s failed inquiries as to the “effect” and “intent”
of redistricting bodies because these inquiries are unnecessary when
the process itself is immune from partisan influence. “[T]he drafters
of a bipartisan plan most likely lack discriminatory intent and are
175
unlikely to draw a plan with severely discriminatory effects.”
By
preventing partisan considerations from entering the process of redistricting at the outset, therefore, these states are assured that the
redistricting plan itself is not an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander with respect to the intent of the bipartisan committee and the effects of the plan. The “intent” and “effects” tests described throughout the previous sections all attempt to discern whether the
redistricting plan was influenced by partisan motivations. By eliminating partisan motivations at the outset, the state is assured of a legitimate redistricting plan without the need for a post hoc analysis.
An additional benefit of a bipartisan compromise is that it avoids
excessive judicial oversight. “When properly designed, such commissions can moderate excessive partisanship without completely excis176
The concern of the
ing the political character of the process.”
mission: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Washington. Id. Maine and Vermont
make such bipartisan commissions advisory only. Id. Connecticut, Illinois, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Texas use bipartisan commissions as a backup system in case
the legislature fails to meet its deadline for submitting its reapportionment plan. Id.
173
Id.
174
See Christopher C. Confer, To Be About the People’s Business: An Examination of the
Utility of Nonpolitical/Bipartisan Legislative Redistricting Commissions, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 115, 118–21 (2004) (reviewing the common methods of achieving a bipartisan
or nonpartisan redistricting commission).
175
Michael E. Lewyn, How to Limit Gerrymandering, 45 FLA. L. REV. 403, 444 (1993).
176
Bates, supra note 162, at 352 (arguing that Congress has the constitutional
power to require all States to adopt independent redistricting commissions).
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Court in Gaffney v. Cummings, as well as in the more recent cases
where members of the Court have argued against justiciability (i.e.,
Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Davis v. Bandemer and Justice Scalia’s
plurality opinion in Vieth v. Jubelirer), should be relieved to a certain
extent. By creating a bipartisan committee tied to the legislature, the
Court leaves the redistricting process to the legislative branch while
being assured that judicial oversight need only be minimal, as there is
little chance for a partisan influence over the process of redistricting
such that the Court must take the redistricting process out of the
hands of the political parties. While remaining political, therefore,
redistricting becomes less partisan-influenced.
IV. A WORKABLE SOLUTION
A workable equal protection solution must respect the “oneperson, one-vote” jurisprudence that has become essential to modern
day political districting. In addition, such a solution must also recognize the problems associated with gerrymandering and avoid the difficulty facing the Supreme Court as to discerning when such partisan
districting has “gone too far” by examining the intent of the redistricting body and the effects of such redistricting. Finally, such a solution should entail minimal judicial intervention, as redistricting is a
political issue that does not lend itself naturally to judicial over177
Taking these factors into account, it is clear that the Court
sight.
should protect the process of redistricting in order to ensure that the
intent of the redistricting body is nonpartisan and the effects of redistricting do not simply protect the incumbents at the expense of the
party not in power. Courts could best accomplish this by creating an
irrebuttable presumption of validity for any redistricting done by a
178
“[I]t is obvious that any districting plan
bipartisan committee.
177

See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 145 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring), stating:
The opportunity to control the drawing of electoral boundaries
through the legislative process of apportionment is a critical and traditional part of politics in the United States, and one that plays no small
role in fostering active participation in the political parties at every
level. Thus, the legislative business of apportionment is fundamentally
a political affair, and challenges to the manner in which an apportionment has been carried out—by the very parties that are responsible
for this process—present a political question in the truest sense of the
term.
178
Such a bipartisan compromise was seen in Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735
(1973), where the Court upheld a plan designed by both parties in order to give
proportional representation of party strength across districts. See supra Part I. Thus,
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based on a bipartisan compromise should be upheld . . . .”
Such a
solution would work to practically eliminate gerrymandering: because
an independent committee will not be motivated by partisan concerns, the effect of any redistricting will not favor partisan preferences.
For these same reasons the Supreme Court’s concern of intent
and effect is relieved. The creation of an irrebuttable presumption of
validity will induce states to adopt independent committees to reduce
litigation, avoid court-ordered redistricting, and assure voters that
their right to vote remains protected. An irrebuttable presumption
for independent committees will also give those current members of
the Court who favor nonjusticiability a workable and manageable
standard for assuring Equal Protection in redistricting. Furthermore:
In addition to reducing political bias in redistricting outcomes,
independent redistricting commissions may have significant corollary benefits. For instance, redistricting plans drawn by nonpartisan commissions may increase the competitiveness of individual
districts . . . . Theoretically, increased district competitiveness
brings a corresponding increase in the responsiveness of district
representation and may also marginally reduce voter apathy by
removing one basis for the perception that individual electoral
participation is irrelevant because electoral outcomes are a fore180
gone conclusion.

Along with an irrebuttable presumption of validity for independent committees, it is equally important to protect the process of
redistricting by invalidating other processes as well. Mid-decade redistricting, such as was involved in Perry, should be held presumptively unconstitutional. Only if the state can prove that the middecade redistricting was done to reflect population changes more accurately (and thus in compliance with “one-person, one-vote”) should
that particular process be upheld. The Equal Protection Clause “requires actions taken by the sovereign to be supported by some legitimate interest, and further establishes that a bare desire to harm a po181
Especially in
litically disfavored group is not a legitimate interest.”
the case of Perry, where the mid-decade redistricting was done shortly
after a new political majority took office, mid-decade redistricting
if the Court were to adopt this Comment’s proposal, it could cite Gaffney for precedent.
179
Lewyn, supra note 175, at 445.
180
Bates, supra note 162, at 353.
181
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2634 (2006)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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carries an air of invalidity. Indeed, “the presence of midcycle redistricting, for any reason, raises a fair inference that partisan machina183
tions played a major role in the map-drawing process.”
Thus, the process of mid-decade redistricting should only be allowed when it is related to a legitimate state interest, namely, redistricting to correct for population changes in order to comply with the
applicable law, including the “one-person, one-vote” requirement
and the Voting Rights Act. Although Justice Kennedy rejected this
184
proposal in Perry, he was joined only by Justices Souter and Ginsberg in that opinion. Justices Stevens and Breyer held that mid185
decade redistricting is unconstitutional. Justices Scalia and Thomas
186
would hold that such claims are not justiciable, and Justice Alito
and Chief Justice Roberts have issued no opinion on the matter.
Therefore, the option is by no means foreclosed. Furthermore, the
Justices in Perry dealt with the intent of the legislature and the effects
of mid-decade redistricting. Perhaps by refocusing the issue purely
on protecting the process, the Court may gain at least five members
who would hold mid-decade redistricting presumptively unconstitutional.
One issue that would require serious attention if this proposal is
adopted is the Court’s role concerning states that fail to adopt an independent committee despite the practical benefits of doing so. In
order for the alternative proposal suggested here to have meaning,
the Court must make it a more attractive alternative than doing nothing. At a minimum, the Court must continue to hold that gerrymandering claims are justiciable. On this level, judicial involvement
would most likely involve a case-by-case inquiry as to the processes
used by a legislature in the course of redistricting. Beyond that, it is
presently unclear how the Court would treat gerrymandering claims
concerning a redistricting done by a partisan legislature notwith187
However, it is
standing the independent committee presumption.
likely that the risk of a substantial majority of states failing to adopt
such independent committees would be low, in light of the benefits
associated with it and the public pressure that may come from voters

182

See id. at 2632.
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 367 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
184
Perry, 126 S. Ct. at 2611–12 (plurality opinion).
185
Id. at 2632–33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
186
Id. at 2663 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
187
For an interesting argument that Congress may have the ability to require
states to adopt such independent committees, see Bates, supra note 162.
183
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to approve independent committees to eliminate gerrymandering
when the Supreme Court has made elimination an attractive alternative.
Another potential issue is the selection of these bipartisan committees. Currently, the states that employ such redistricting bodies
188
have different processes to select committee members.
It is vital
that the selection of the committee members also be free from partisan motivations and that the committee accurately reflects independent bipartisanship. Thus, the Court might be forced to set some criteria for committee selection, such as the number of members,
defining who selects the various committee members, and defining
the population from which members are selected. Because the Court
would, in implementing an irrebuttable presumption, have no power
to overturn a districting plan drawn by a bipartisan committee, the
Court must make sure that the procedure by which the bipartisan
committee is selected is not susceptible to partisan control. One potential solution would be to allow the Court to review and, if necessary, amend the initial committee selection process, whereby challengers may assert claims that the selection procedure itself is faulty.
This would ensure that the committee is truly bipartisan and thereby
ensure that any resulting districting plan is not an unconstitutional
gerrymander.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s difficulty articulating
workable standards for adjudicating gerrymandering claims stems
from the fact that the Court has attempted to measure such an Equal
Protection violation by the effects of partisan redistricting, similar to
the Court’s measure of violations with respect to malapportion189
ment.
Unfortunately, there has been no sufficiently objective standard, so the Court has been fractured as to the justiciability of gerrymandering claims, as well as the considerations involved in finding
constitutional violations. Additionally, the constraint of “one-person,
one-vote” provides cover for redistricting bodies that have partisan
motives in mind because that standard requires artificial and frequent redistricting. Several states have attempted to solve this problem by requiring that redistricting be done by independent commit-

188
189

See Confer, supra note 174, at 119–23.
See supra Parts I, II.

FARLEY_FINAL_V2

426

1/7/2008 6:25:29 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW
190

[Vol. 38:397

tees.
This ensures that partisan intent remains excluded from the
process, and that the effects of redistricting will be politically neutral.
This Comment proposes that the Supreme Court take its cue
from the states that have implemented a bipartisan redistricting
commission and declare that redistricting by an independent committee is irrebuttably presumed to be constitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause. This safe harbor will entice voters and legislatures
alike. Protecting the process of redistricting has the additional advantage of alleviating the concerns of the various justices who argue
for nonjusticiability as well as ensuring that, for those justices who
would require it, the intent/effect requirement is satisfied. Protecting the process of redistricting would be further accomplished if the
Court were to hold that mid-decade redistricting is presumptively invalid and that only a showing of a legitimate state interest of preserving “one-person, one-vote” would suffice to rebut that presumption.
It does, however, remain to be seen how the Court would treat those
States that would continue to engage in partisan redistricting.
Thus, by protecting the process, the Court ensures that Equal
Protection is sustained by an objectively measurable standard, a standard that is judicially manageable and complies with the requirement
of “one-person, one-vote.”

190

See supra Part III.B.

